Paul Kocialkowski's coding blog

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Samsung

The Samsung Galaxy back-door was bullshit. Really?

Written by Paul Kocialkowski - 15 march 2014 - 18 comments

A few days ago, I disclosed (on behalf of the Replicant projet) our research regarding a back-door found in a proprietary program running on Samsung Galaxy devices' applications processor. This back-door lets the modem perform I/O operations on the device's storage.

For the full statement, please refer to the article posted at Free Software Foundation's website. The relevant technical analysis is available at the Replicant wiki and a complementary statement was issued at the Replicant blog.

In the few hours following the publication, an outstanding number of technology-oriented websites relayed the news, including Phoronix, Slashdot, LWN and XDA-Developers. I'm very glad the press found interest in that research and I'm confident it'll help more and more individuals realize the importance of being in control of their computing: that is, to understand what's at stake with free software.

A few recent developments particularly caught my attention: Ars technica bothered to ask an actual security researcher, Dan Rosenberg his thoughts on our findings. Good thing they decided to go deeper than only duplicating the information. On the other hand, Samsung issued a statement about this issue:

Samsung takes the security of its products extremely seriously. We have investigated the claims that have been made and can confirm that there is no security risk. The Free Software Foundation’s recent allegations are based on a false understanding of the software feature that enables communication between the modem and the Application Processor chipset.

Mostly, the point that is argued by Dan Rosenberg is that there is no evidence of any ability for a remote party to use the back-door, nor any known exploit to make use of it remotely. As a matter of fact, we didn't look at how this could be used over the air: this was not the point of our research. The problem we intended to highlight is not so much about how in practical terms an intruder could use this anti-feature remotely to access and modify the data stored on the device, but rather to show that a particular proprietary software implements a feature that could be used to let the modem gain data I/O access over the device. This is where we find the back-door to be: at the interface between the modem and the applications processor. We do consider the modem to be an “unknown” area that offers no guarantee at all regarding security, since it is running proprietary software. Hence, we believe it is relevant to assume the worse and consider it compromised and subject to remote control. Several indications tend to make us think this is actually what is going on: Craig Murray described how a mobile phone had been remotely converted to a spying device in Murder in Samarkand. Considering the recent revelations regarding the practices of several governments' intelligence agencies, we find it hard to believe there is no way modems cannot be remotely compromised.

The goal of our action was to make people aware of that particular issue. One might consider it to have no value, provided they don't think modems can be remotely compromised and others might see it as a crucial security flaw in the event the modem is compromised, as we do. The fact that it was implemented for another purpose or was not intended to be used in malicious ways doesn't change anything at all: an attacker with remote access to the modem will be able to issue the incriminated requests. There is no possible “false understanding”, in the way Samsung seems to imply here.

For the record, we didn't at any point intend to distort the truth to bring attention to our project or our research, nor did we intend to ruin Samsung's reputation. We simply felt it was our moral responsibility to spread the word about it. I believe anyone can decide for themselves whether they have faith in Samsung's good word that this introduces no further security risk, but let it be clear that it doesn't get any more certain than what good faith can provide. We are still looking forward to working with Samsung to make things right, in case they decide to abandon their current position of denial.

The Samsung S5C73M3 interleaved format

Written by Paul Kocialkowski - 03 august 2013 - no comments

I am currently working on writing a free software replacement for the Galaxy S3 camera module, based on the Exynos Camera module I wrote a couple months ago for the Galaxy S2. Both are using V4L2, but the implementation differs in details. Especially, the Galaxy S3's back camera, the Samsung S5C73M3, uses an interleaved format for picture capture.

As an interleaved format, there is no standard and readily-usable implementation to decode the data. After searching for a long time, all I could find was a commit by one of Samsung's developers that introduced that format to mainline, through a LinuxTV patch. First of all, I can't seem to understand why such a patch was accepted mainline given that there is no decoder implementation for that format out there. Moreover, the only camera chip that uses it, the S5C73M3, has a driver that was also accepted in mainline. It seems to me like it was blindly included and nobody cared so much about how it works in practice. Moreover, it seems that this camera chip is mostly found in the Galaxy S3, and I doubt anyone tested mainline on the Galaxy S3 to see whether the S5C73M3 driver works and gives appropriate results.

However, let's not complain too much, that patch gave me crucial info to understand how to properly extract YUV and JPEG from the interleaved data. For reference, here are the explanations given with the patch:

Two-planar format used by Samsung S5C73MX cameras. The first plane contains interleaved JPEG and UYVY image data, followed by meta data in form of an array of offsets to the UYVY data blocks. The actual pointer array follows immediately the interleaved JPEG/UYVY data, the number of entries in this array equals the height of the UYVY image. Each entry is a 4-byte unsigned integer in big endian order and it's an offset to a single pixel line of the UYVY image. The first plane can start either with JPEG or UYVY data chunk. The size of a single UYVY block equals the UYVY image's width multiplied by 2. The size of a JPEG chunk depends on the image and can vary with each line.

The second plane, at an offset of 4084 bytes, contains a 4-byte offset to the pointer array in the first plane. This offset is followed by a 4-byte value indicating size of the pointer array. All numbers in the second plane are also in big endian order. Remaining data in the second plane is undefined. The information in the second plane allows to easily find location of the pointer array, which can be different for each frame. The size of the pointer array is constant for given UYVY image height.

In order to extract UYVY and JPEG frames an application can initially set a data pointer to the start of first plane and then add an offset from the first entry of the pointers table. Such a pointer indicates start of an UYVY image pixel line. Whole UYVY line can be copied to a separate buffer. These steps should be repeated for each line, i.e. the number of entries in the pointer array. Anything what's in between the UYVY lines is JPEG data and should be concatenated to form the JPEG stream. 

At first, I was only getting the first 0xA00000 bytes, which is in fact only the first plane. Hence, I couldn't find the offset to that pointers array (even though I could locate it manually). I had to enable embeded data with the V4L2_CID_EMBEDDEDDATA_ENABLE control. With that, the buffer gets 0x1000 more bytes: that's the second plane. Then by applying an offset of 4084 bytes to the start of that second plane, I could locate the offset to the pointers array.

Since I complained it was lacking, I wrote a reference implementation that separates the YUV (it's actually UYVY) and JPEG data from the interleaved format: s5c73m3_interleaved_decode.c.

2013-08-06 Update: As I sent an email to the Samsung developers involved in the mainline patch, I was given details on the format (that I already figured out though) as well as a C implementation to separate JPEG and UYVY. The developer also told me he is going to release sample code to decode the format, publicly. So I think things are going to be fine, and my criticism will soon no longer be valid. Yay!